Computer underground Digest Sun 4 Apr, 1999 Volume 11 : Issue 21 ISSN 1004-042X Editor: Jim Thomas (firstname.lastname@example.org) News Editor: Gordon Meyer (email@example.com) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Copy Editer: Etaion Shrdlu, III Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest CONTENTS, #11.21 (Sun, 4 Apr, 1999) File 1--Virus Suspect Mean no Harm, Lawyer says (AP excerpt) File 2--"Melissa" macro virus File 3--regarding melissa and microsoft statement File 4--Help B92 press release 03-04-1999 File 5--Access to NATO's Web Site Disrupted File 6--CFP 99: Final Reminder File 7--CPSR Newsletter on the WWW File 8--Free SANS Web Briefing: IDNET File 9--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 10 Jan, 1999) CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE. TO UNSUB, SEE ADMINISTRAVIA IN CONCLUDING FILE --------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 5 Apr 1999 01:09:39 EDT From: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: File 1--Virus Suspect Mean no Harm, Lawyer says (AP excerpt) VIRUS SUSPECT MEANT NO HARM, LAWYER SAYS Associated Press. TRENTON, N.J. The man accused of creating the so-called Melissa virus, which infected thousands of computers and overloaded e-mail systems worldwide, never intended to do anything wrong, his lawyer said Saturday. David L. Smith, a 30-year-old computer programmer, will plead not guilty to the state charges, said lawyer Steven Altman. Smith was arrested Thursday night at a brother's house in Eatontown. He faces charges that include interruption of public communications, conspiracy and theft of computer service. The charges carry a maximum penalty of 40 years in prison and a $480,000 fine. ((snip)) The New York Times reported Saturday that investigators determined that the first copy of the Melissa virus originated from an account with Monmouth Internet Corp., based in Red Bank, and then traced it to Smith's telephone line. Apparently frightened when the FBI posted a warning about Melissa last week, Smith threw his computer equipment into a trash bin at his apartment complex, investigators said. ((snip)) ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 30 Mar 1999 16:51:23 -0800 From: "Rob Slade, doting grandpa of Ryan and Trevor"
To: email@example.com Cc: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com Subject: File 2--"Melissa" macro virus The Melissa macro virus A report prepared by Robert M. Slade The following is an attempt to bring together the information about the Melissa virus. It is taken from the most reliable available sources. Additional sites have been listed at the end of the article. I have not added a copyright line to this message in order to allow it to be used as needed. I will be posting the latest updated version of this article at http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade/melissa.txt and http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev/melissa.txt. The virus, generally referred to as W97M.Melissa.A (with some variations: Symantec, in a rather strained effort to be cute, seems to be calling it "Mailissa"), is a MS Word macro virus. This means that, if you don't use Word, you are safe. Completely safe. (Except for being dependent upon other people who might slow their/your mail server down. More on that later.) If you need to look at MS Word documents, there is a document viewer available (free, as it happens) from Microsoft. This viewer will not execute macros, so it is safe from infection. In the messages about Melissa, there have been many references to the mythical and non-existent "Good Times" virus. Note that simply reading the text of a message still cannot infect you. However, note also that many mailers, in the name of convenience, are becoming more and more automated, and much of this automation concerns running attached files for you. As Padgett Peterson, author of one of the best macro virus protection tools, has stated, "For years we have been saying you could not get a virus just by "opening E-Mail. That bug is being fixed." Melissa does not carry any specifically damaging payload. If the message is triggered there will be text added to the active document. The mailout function can cause a large number of messages to be generated very quickly, and this has caused the shutdown of a number of corporate mail servers. If you have Word set with macros disabled, then the virus will not active. However, relying on this protection is a very dangerous proposition. Previous macro viruses have also killed macro protection in Word, and this one does as well. The name "Melissa" comes from the class module that contains the virus. The name is also used in the registry flag set by the virus. The virus is spread, of course, by infected Word documents. What has made it the "bug du jour" is that it spreads *itself* via email. We have known about viruses being spread as attachments to email for a long time, and have been warning people not to execute attachments (or read Word documents sent as attachments) if you don't know where they came from. Happy99 is a good example: it has spread very widely in the past month by sending itself out as an email attachment whenever it infects a system. Melissa was originally posted to the alt.sex newsgroup. At that time it was LIST.DOC, and purported to be a list of passwords for sex sites. I have seen at least one message theorizing that Melissa is someone's ill-conceived punishment for viewers of pornography. This hypothesis is extremely unlikely. Sending a virus to a sex related newsgroup seems to be a reliable way to ensure that a number of stupid people will read and/or execute your program, and start your new virus off with a bang. (No pun intended.) If you get a message with a Melissa infected document, and do whatever you need to do to "invoke" the attachment, and have Word on your system as the default program for .doc files, Word starts up, reads in the document, and the macro is ready to start. If you have Word's "macro security" enabled (which is not the default) it will tell you that there is a macro in the document. Few people understand the import of the warning, and there is no distinction between legitimate macros and macro viruses. Because of a technical different between normal macros and "VBA objects," if you ask for a list of the macros in the document, Melissa will not show up. It will be visible if you use the Visual Basic Editor, but only after you have loaded the infected file. Assuming that the macro starts executing, several things happen. The virus first checks to see if Word 97 (Word 8) or Word 2000 (Word 9) is running. If so, it reduces the level of the security warnings on Word so that you will receive no future warnings. In Word97, the virus disables the Tools/Macro menu commands, the Confirm Conversions option, the MS Word macro virus protection, and the Save Normal Template prompt. It "upconverts" to Word 2000 quite nicely, and there disables the Tools/Macro/Security menu. Specifically, under Word 97 it blocks access to the Tools|Macro menu item, meaning you cannot check any macros. It also turns off the warnings for conversion, macro detection, and to save modifications to the NORMAL.DOT file. Under Word 2000 it blocks access to the menu item that allows you to raise your security level, and sets your macro virus detection to the lowest level, that is, none. (Since the access to the macro security menu item is blocked, I do not know how this feature can be reversed, other than programmatically or by reinstallation.) After this, the virus checks for the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\Melissa?\ registry key with a value of "... by Kwyjibo". (The "kwyjibo" entry seems to be a reference to the "Bart the Genius" episode of the "Simpsons" television program where this word was used to win a Scrabble match.) If this is the first time you have been infected (and this "first time" business is slightly complicated), then the macro starts up Outlook, in the background, and sends itself as an attachment to the "top" 50 names in *each* of your address lists. (Melissa will *not* use Outlook Express.) Most people have only one (the default is "Contacts"), but if you have more than one then Outlook will send more than 50 copies of the message. Outlook also sorts address lists such that mailing lists are at the top of the list, so this can get a much wider dispersal than just fifty copies of the message/virus. There was also a mention on one message about MAPI and Exchange servers, which may give access to a very large number of mailing lists. From other reports, though, people who use Exchange mail server are being particularly hard hit. Then again, people who use Exchange are probably also standardized on Word and Outlook. Some have suggested setting this registry key as a preventative measure, but note that it only prevents the mailout. It does not prevent infection. If you are infected, and the registry key is removed at a later date, then a mailout will be triggered the next time an infected document is read. Once the messages have been sent, the virus sets the Melissa flag in the registry, and looks for it to check whether or not to send itself out on subsequent infections. If the flag does not persist, then there will be subsequent mass mailings. Because the key is set in HKEY_CURRENT_USER, system administrators may have set permissions such that changes made are not saved, and thus the key will not persist. In addition, multiple users on the same machine will likely each trigger a separate mailout, and the probability of cross infection on a common machine is very high. Since it is a macro virus, it will infect your NORMAL.DOT, and will infect all documents thereafter. The macro within NORMAL.DOT is "Document_Close()" so that any document that is worked on will be infected when it is closed. When a document is infected the macro inserted is "Document_Open()" so that the macro runs when the document is opened. Note that *not* using Outlook does not protect you from the virus, it only means that the 50 copies will not be automatically sent out. If you use Word but not Outlook, you will still be infected, and may still send out infected documents on your own. The virus also will not invoke the mailout on Mac systems, but definitely can be stored and resent from Macs. At this time I do not have reliable information about whether it can reproduce on Macs (there is one report that it does), but the likelihood is that it can. Vesselin Bontchev has noted that the virus never explicitly terminates the Outlook program. It is possible that multiple copies may be invoked, and may create memory problems. However, this has not been confirmed, and is not probable given the "first time" flag that is set. The message appears to come from the person just infected, of course, since it really is sent from that machine. This means that when you get an "infected" message it will probably appear to come from someone you know and deal with. The subject line is "Important Message From: [name of sender]" with the name taken from the registration settings in Word. The test of the body states "Here is that document you asked for ... don't show anyone else ;-)". Thus, the message is easily identifiable: that subject line, the very brief message, and an attached Word document (file with a .doc extension to the filename). If you receive a message of this form *DO NOT OPEN THE DOCUMENT WITH WORD!* If you do not have alternate means or competent virus assistance, the best recourse is to delete the message, and attachment, and to send a message to the sender alerting them to the fact that they are, very likely, infected. Please note all the specifics in this paragraph, and do not start a panic by sending warnings to everyone who sends you any message with an attachment. However, please also note that, as with any Word macro virus, the source code travels with the infection, and it will be very easy to create modifications to Melissa. (The source code has already been posted to one Web site.) We will, no doubt very soon, start seeing many Melissa variants with different subjects and messages. There is already one similar Excel macro virus, called "Papa." The virus contains the text "Fred Cohen" and "all.net," leading one rather ignorant reporter to assume that Fred was the author. Dr. Cohen was the first person to do formal research into viral programs. There is a message that is displayed approximately one time in sixty. The exact trigger is if the current system time minute field matches the current system time day of the month field when the virus is run. In that case, you will "Twenty-two points, plus triple-word-score, plus fifty points for using all my letters. Game's over. I'm outta here." typed into your document. (This is another reference to the "Simpsons" episode referred to earlier.) One rather important point: the document passed is the active document, not necessarily the original posted on alt.sex. So, for example, if I am infected, and prepare some confidential information for you in Word, and send you an attachment with the Word document, containing sensitive information that neither you nor I want made public (say, the fact that Bill Gates is a jerk for having designed the technology this way), and you read it in Word, and you have Outlook on your machine, then that document will be mailed out to the top 50 people in your address book. Rather ironically, a clue to the identity of the perpetrator may have come from the identification number embedding scheme recently admitted by Microsoft as having been included with Office and Windows 98. A number of fixes for mail servers and mail filtering systems have been devised very quickly. However, note that not all of these have fully tested or debugged. One version that I saw would trap most of the warning messages about Melissa. Note that any Word document can be infected, and that an infected user may unintentionally send you an infected document. All Word documents, and indeed all Office files, should be checked for infection before you load them. Information and antiviral updates (some URLs are wrapped): http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-04-Melissa-Macro-Virus.html http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/j-037.shtml ftp://ftp.complex.is/pub/macrdef2.zip http://www.complex.is/f-prot/f-prot.html http://chkpt.zdnet.com/chkpt/hud0007500a/www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/ news/0,4586,2233030,00.html http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/special/melissavirus.html http://www.symantec.com/techsupp/mailissa.html http://www.antivirus.com/vinfo/security/sa032699.htm http://www.avp.com/melissa/melissa.html http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-002.asp http://www.sendmail.com/blockmelissa.html ftp://ftp.rubyriver.com/pub/jhardin/antispam/procmail-security.html http://www.innosoft.com/iii/pmdf/virus-word-emergency.html http://www.sophos.com/downloads/ide/index.html#melissa http://www.avertlabs.com/public/datafiles/valerts/vinfo/melissa.asp http://www.pcworld.com/cgi-bin/pcwtoday?ID=10302 http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article/0,1087,3_89011,00.html http://cnn.com/TECH/computing/9903/29/melissa.copycat.idg/ http://www.pcworld.com/cgi-bin/pcwtoday?ID=10308 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 10:53:05 -0500 From: andrew hreschak Subject: File 3--regarding melissa and microsoft statement in regards to the microsoft statement (pasted below): > Will Office 97/Office 2000 protect me from this and other macro viruses? > > Yes. Word 97 and Word 2000 will protect you from macro viruses > including this one, provided the macro virus protection is turned on > (this is the default setting). With the macro virus protection turned > on, every time you receive a Word document that contains macros, a > dialog box opens and allows you to choose whether to enable the > macros. You should always disable macros when you are not certain of > their purpose or functionality. By choosing to disable the macros, you > will prevent this and any macro virus from running, rendering them > harmless. The virus is only activated if you open the attached Word > document and choose to enable the macros or if your macro virus > protection settings have been turned off. it should be noted that office 97 contains a bug which apparently has not been fixed in version 2000. this bug allows macros to be executed without asking for user-input (i.e. asking the user whether or not they wish to run the macro). the statement pasted above is quite misleading, especially considering that microsoft has acknowledged this bug: http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-002.asp the fact remains, however, that without the patch having been executed, it is possible for a user to become infected by a virus in a macro which executes on its own. the existence of this bug is well-known, and i find it surprising that the author of this virus did not exploit this weakness. however, it has now become known that a new virus (pappa) has begun to spread across internet. i would expect that many similar virii will follow, and that some will, in fact, use this security hole to proliferate in a more widespread manner. we can, i think, consider ourselves lucky that melissa, in its current iteration, did not carry a destructive payload. the potential is certainly there. sincerely, andrew hreschak ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 3 Apr 1999 19:12:55 +0200 (CEST) From: Maurice Wessling Subject: File 4--Help B92 press release 03-04-1999 Press Release April 3 1999 THE FREE VOICE OF B92 BANNED: THE STRUGGLE GOES ON Latest news: http://helpb92.xs4all.nl The last message from Yugoslavia's most prominent independent broadcaster -B92 - as government officials and the police moved in on April 2, 1999, to take over the station and silence the last vestiges of free speech in Serbia was - 'Keep The Faith!' HelpB92 was launched on March 25, 1999, to do just that. The support group uses Internet technology to enable B92 and all other banned independent media in Yugoslavia defend their right to speak freely, and the pivotal role of free media to regional stability. The action against B92 comes at the end of a week of intense media repression against independent media in Yugoslavia. On March 24, government officials confiscated B92's transmitter, cutting off direct radio broadcasts to Belgrade. B92 responded by harnessing the power of the Internet and Real Audio, satellite, medium wave broadcasts and solidarity rebroadcasting across the world to its struggle for free speech. B92 supporters responded in record number - the B92 web site had 15 million visitors in just 7 days. At the same time, in the past ten days, ten rebroadcasters of B92's news from the Association of Independent Electronic Media - ANEM have been closed down by the government. Other ANEM members have the either taken themselves voluntarily off the air rather than re-broadcast the propaganda of state radio and TV, which they must do by law when the country is in a state of war, or have been taken over by the government. In Kosovo, the offices of the two most important alternative Albanian language media - Koha and Radio 21 - have also been destroyed and their staff have fled the country. The closure of B92, on April 2, 1999, means that the only source of information left for audiences and viewers in the region is the state-controlled Radio Television Serbia. All the journalists from these banned independent media are now in dire straits and money is urgently needed to help assist these journalists to find new means to get news out. We therefore ask people to please express their involvement and support this cause by donating money to the special HelpB92 fund, bank account number 7676, Postbank Amsterdam, Swift address INGBNL2A, in the name of Press Now. Please specify 'Help B92' ------- Notes for the Editor In the last week, HelpB92 has received an enormous amount of support from around the globe. In Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan and Australia supporting web sites have been established in their national languages. Hundreds of people and organisations have placed the HelpB92 logo and link to the web site on their home pages and signed the interactive guest book. Future actions include benefit concerts, global rebroadcasting initiatives and Internet Real Audio actions. HelpB92 was founded by: B92, De Balie, De Digitale Stad, Next 5 Minutes, Press Now, Public Netbase (Austria), radioqualia (Australia), De Waag (MONM) and XS4ALL Internet. B92 Website: http://www.b92.net HelpB92 campaign: http://helpb92.xs4all.nl E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org For more information contact: Julia Glyn-Pickett B92 Spokesperson E-mail: email@example.com Phone: +31 20 4272127 ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 21:55:05 -0600 (CST) From: Jim Thomas Subject: File 5--Access to NATO's Web Site Disrupted Source - http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/31/nato.hack/ Access to NATO's Web site disrupted nato site "Pinging" disrupted access to NATO's Web site March 31, 1999 Web posted at: 10:42 a.m. EST (1542 GMT) BRUSSELS, Belgium (CNN) -- NATO's Web site is under deliberate electronic "bombardment" from Yugoslavia that has made e-mail service and access to the site "erratic," NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said Wednesday. Shea said that computer users in Belgrade have been "pinging" the NATO site -- sending repeated requests to the NATO server to confirm that it's online -- since Sunday. The "ping bombardment strategy," Shea said, has "caused line saturation" and noticeably disrupted access to the alliance's Web site. NATO's Web site contains the latest news releases and transcripts of news conferences concerning the campaign against Yugoslavia. Journalists around the world, as well as other people, look at the site for information. Additionally, Shea said NATO's e-mail servers were being "saturated by one individual who is currently sending us 2,000 e-mails a day." "And we are dealing with macro viruses from Yugoslavia in our e-mail service," he said. Shea did not say whether the "macro viruses" he mentioned were from the recently released "Melissa" virus that causes e-mail recipients to unknowingly spread infected files to other e-mail users. The NATO spokesman said that, despite the problems, NATO would continue to put out up-to-date information. ------------------------------ Hacker Pleads Guilty in Agreement .c The Associated Press By MICHAEL WHITE LOS ANGELES (AP) -- Kevin Mitnick, a computer vandal whose exploits made him the FBI's most wanted hacker, pleaded guilty Friday to computer and wire fraud charges in a deal that could make him a free man in a year. Mitnick, who admitted causing millions of dollars in damage to companies whose computer systems he penetrated, pleaded guilty to five felony counts in U.S. District Court. Under a deal with prosecutors, Mitnick, 35, will be sentenced to three years, 10 months in prison but will be credited for time served, meaning he will be eligible for release in mid-2000. (snip) ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 29 Mar 1999 19:21:22 -0500 From: EPIC-News List Subject: File 6--CFP 99: Final Reminder Register now for the cyber event of the year: C COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY F THE GLOBAL INTERNET P 9 WASHINGTON, DC 9 Omni Shoreham Hotel . April 6-8, 1999 O R G ** Online Registration Deadline - March 30, 1999 ** For almost a decade, the conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy has shaped the public debate on the future of privacy and freedom in the online world. Register now for the number one Internet policy conference. Join a diverse audience from government, industry, academics, the non-profit sector, the hacker community and the media. Enjoy the U.S. Capital in the spring at one of Washington's premier hotels. * Keynote speakers include Tim Berners-Lee (Director, World Wide Web Consortium), Vint Cerf (President, Internet Society), Congressman Ed Markey (sponsor of "The Electronic Bill of Rights Act"), Congressman Ron Paul (sponsor of the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act), Henrikas Yushkiavitshus (Associate Director, UNESCO), and Commissioner Mozelle Thompson, Federal Trade Commission * Lively and thought-provoking panels on -- "the Creation of a Global Surveillance Network," "Access and Equity on the Global Internet," "Anonymity and Identity in Cyberspace," "Free Speech and Cyber Censorship," "Is Escrow Dead? And what is Wassenaar?", "Self-Regulation Reconsidered" and more. * Tutorials -- "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act" (Mark Eckenwiler); "Cryptography: Basic Overview & Nontraditional Uses" (Matt Blaze and Phil Zimmermann), "Free Speech, The Constitution and Privacy in Cyberspace" (Mike Godwin), "Techniques for Circumventing Internet Censorship" (Bennett Haselton and Brian Ristuccia). * Other Events -- Privacy International's Big Brother Awards to the worst privacy violators in the US, EFF's Pioneer Awards to those who have done the most to promote the net. Online Registration Deadline - March 30, 1999 -------------------------------------------- Register on-line at http://www.regmaster.com/cfp99.html or call +1 407 628 3602. Registration inquiries may also be sent to firstname.lastname@example.org. For more information about CFP99, visit http://www.cfp99.org/ or call +1 410 628 3186 ------------------------------ Date: 29 Mar 1999 17:33:22 -0000 From: email@example.com Subject: File 7--CPSR Newsletter on the WWW CPSR WINTER NEWSLETTER FOCUSES ON Y2K "Will my house be warm on January 1, 2000?" "Will I be able to fill my gas tank?" "Will we have an accidental war?" "Should I take all my cash out of the bank?" Those are the questions inundating CPSR members. The most obvious response CPSR can make is to dedicate an issue of the CPSR Newsletter to sating the thirst with our "take" on the issues. A BREAKTHROUGH FOR CPSR PUBLICATIONS The Special Winter 1999 Issue of the CPSR Newsletter will be our first-ever completely online. You can link to it from our home page or from: http://www.cpsr.org/publications/newsletters/issues/1999/Winter1999/. If you wish, we can email you a text version or mail you a transcript. Just let our office know at firstname.lastname@example.org. Guest editor: Marsha Woodbury. WHAT YOU'LL FIND Arthur C. Clarke's chapter, "The Century Syndrome," from his novel, The Ghost from the Grand Banks. "A Perspective on Y2K," by Peter Neumann, who won the Norbert Weiner Award in 1997 for his work on documenting computer risks. He views Y2K as a serious concern and also as the tip of a much larger iceberg of computer risk. Gary Chapman, former Executive Director of CPSR, has two articles: "Now for Another Daunting Y2K Task: Educating America's Masses," and "A Moral Project for the the 21st Century: Stop Creating Better Weapons." Tony Ralston, professor emeritus of computer science and member of the CPSR advisory board, gives his impressions of the Y2K problem in "Y2K and Social Responsibility." Lenny Siegel's article "OOPs 2000: The Y2K Bug and the Threat of Catastrophic Chemical Releases." Khursch Ahmed, David Parnas, Barbara Simons, and Terry Winograd express their nuclear weapons concerns Norman Kurland and others in the CPSR Y2K Working Group wrote the "How Y2K Will Impact the New York Times." Marsha Woodbury, Chair of CPSR, contributes the introduction, "Y2K: A Broad View." Y2K Humorfrom the Internet and Beyond," collected by friends and members. Chapter news, letters to the editor, a cartoon, and more. Let's use Y2K to explore computer risks and our relationship to them. Take a look at the Y2K newsletter! > -- Susan Evoy * Deputy Director http://www.cpsr.org/ Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility P.O. Box 717 * Palo Alto * CA * 94302 Phone: (650) 322-3778 * Fax: (650) 322-4748 * Email: email@example.com Donations online: https://swww.igc.apc.org/cpsr/sec-membership-form.html CPSR WINTER NEWSLETTER FOCUSES ON Y2K "Will my house be warm on January 1, 2000?" "Will I be able to fill my gas tank?" "Will we have an accidental war?" "Should I take all my cash out of the bank?" Those are the questions inundating CPSR members. The most obvious response CPSR can make is to dedicate an issue of the CPSR Newsletter to sating the thirst with our "take" on the issues. A BREAKTHROUGH FOR CPSR PUBLICATIONS The Special Winter 1999 Issue of the CPSR Newsletter will be our first-ever completely online. You can link to it from our home page or from: http://www.cpsr.org/publications/newsletters/issues/1999/Winter1999/. If you wish, we can email you a text version or mail you a transcript. Just let our office know at firstname.lastname@example.org. Guest editor: Marsha Woodbury. WHAT YOU'LL FIND Arthur C. Clarke's chapter, "The Century Syndrome," from his novel, The Ghost from the Grand Banks. "A Perspective on Y2K," by Peter Neumann, who won the Norbert Weiner Award in 1997 for his work on documenting computer risks. He views Y2K as a serious concern and also as the tip of a much larger iceberg of computer risk. Gary Chapman, former Executive Director of CPSR, has two articles: "Now for Another Daunting Y2K Task: Educating America's Masses," and "A Moral Project for the the 21st Century: Stop Creating Better Weapons." Tony Ralston, professor emeritus of computer science and member of the CPSR advisory board, gives his impressions of the Y2K problem in "Y2K and Social Responsibility." Lenny Siegel's article "OOPs 2000: The Y2K Bug and the Threat of Catastrophic Chemical Releases." Khursch Ahmed, David Parnas, Barbara Simons, and Terry Winograd express their nuclear weapons concerns Norman Kurland and others in the CPSR Y2K Working Group wrote the "How Y2K Will Impact the New York Times." Marsha Woodbury, Chair of CPSR, contributes the introduction, "Y2K: A Broad View." Y2K Humorfrom the Internet and Beyond," collected by friends and members. Chapter news, letters to the editor, a cartoon, and more. Let's use Y2K to explore computer risks and our relationship to them. Take a look at the Y2K newsletter! > -- Susan Evoy * Deputy Director http://www.cpsr.org/ Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility P.O. Box 717 * Palo Alto * CA * 94302 Phone: (650) 322-3778 * Fax: (650) 322-4748 * Email: email@example.com Donations online: https://swww.igc.apc.org/cpsr/sec-membership-form.html ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 1 Apr 1999 13:29:03 -0700 (MST) From: The SANS Institute Subject: File 8--Free SANS Web Briefing: IDNET Re: Free SANS Web Briefing #4: Tuesday, April 6, 1999 Topic: Comparing Intrusion Detection Systems, ID'Net 99 Time: Tuesday, April 6, 1999, 1 pm EST Hosts: Stephen Northcutt and Rob Kolstad Cost: Free (with high value) One of the questions we received from the March 2 web broadcast (on the advanced network scanning tool called nmap) was: "what is the best intrusion detection software?" Three weeks ago Stephen was part of a working group to help frame the research agenda for the President's Decision Directive 63, which deals with intrusion detection. On the last day there was a discussion period with a single hot topic: how to compare intrusion detection systems. This webcast will focus on one approach to this problem, SANS's Intrusion Detection Network ID'Net which was operational at the ID'99 conference in San Diego and will run again at the SANS Conference (May 7-14 in Baltimore, MD). We will discuss the history and challenges of comparing intrusion detection systems and some of the results of this first effort. Guests on the broadcast will be: * Simson Garfinkle, co-author of Practical Unix Security who demonstrated Sandstorm's TCP Demux network forensic tool and was able to capture and analyze the attacks * Steve Schall, senior network engineer from ODS, who demonstrated his company's network switch which has an integrated intrusion detection capability. * Paul Proctor, Chief Technology Officer at Centrax who showed their new network intrusion detection capability on ID'Net and he will discuss his experiences * Chris Pettit, a senior network engineer for NCI, who is the chair of the next ID'Net in May. Should be a great show; hope to see you there! When: Tuesday, April 6, 1999 (and later for `reruns') 10 am Pacific Time, 11 am Mountain, noon Central, 1 pm Eastern, 1800 GMT Duration: 60 minutes Cost: Free How: Register at http://www.sans.org/apr6.htm The website should reply within a minute or two with the URL and password for the free broadcast. If you don't get a reply within a few minutes, please let Rob know at . Feel free to share this announcement with any potentially interested parties. Rob ps: This message is coming to you from our shiny new mail server. Please direct comments, complaints, duplicates, corrections, and unsubscribes to -- please include your SD number from the header. Alan Paller & Rob Kolstad The SANS Institute firstname.lastname@example.org 301-951-0102 ----- Upcoming Events: ------------------------ Current Publications: ---- Intr Detect & Response (San Diego 2/99) SANS Network Security Digest The SANS NT Digest SANS '99 (Baltimore, 5/99) Windows NT Security: Step-by-Step Network Security 99 (New Orleans, 10/99) Incident Handling: Step-by-Step Intrusion Detection: Shadow Style 1998 SANS Salary Survey See http://www.sans.org for info WindowsNT Power Tools: Consensus ------------------------------ ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 10 Jan 1999 22:51:01 CST From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 9--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 10 Jan, 1999) Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. 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